이 책도 좋은 토론거리를 제공해 주리라 생각하구요. 이 책은 예수를 로마에 항전하는 젤롯당 멤버는 아니었지만 그에 준하는 활동을 한 것으로 묘사하고 있는 것 같구요. 예수에 대한 해석은 워낙 다양하니 역사적 예수산업은 가장 돈이 되는 것 같습니다. 역사적 붇다에 대한 논의도 이렇게 활발했으면 좋겠구요. 이것은 그냥 흘러가는 말이고요. 진짜 주제는 아래에 있습니다. 

애슬란이 쓴 글은 상당한 논란거리를 제공합니다. 아래 칼럼은 원래 다다음 주나 좀 여유가 있을 때 올리려고 했는데, 아래 토마님의 안티동성애에 대한 의견도 있어서 미리 올립니다. 칼럼의 주제는 이번에 캐나다 오타와에서 일어난 태러리즘에 대한 글입니다. Zehaf-Bibeau의 태러 행위는 그가 갖는 종교적 신념 땜이라고 말들이 많은 데에 대한 것입니다. 종교적 신념이 사람들의 행동에 영향을 미칠 가능성은 분명하지만, 신념과 행위 사이의 필연적 인과적 연관성은 재고해 봐야 한다는 것이죠. 그런데 사회과학자들에 의하면 신념이 행동으로 이르는 인과적인 관계보다는 복잡한 사회적, 정치적, 문화적, 윤리적, 정서적, 종교적 요인들의 결합이라는 겁니다. 여기서 애슬란이 주장하는 "사회과학자들"이 누구인지에 대한 분명한 명시를 하고 있지 않습니다. 여기에서 말하는 사회과학자들에 대해서 아는 분이 있어서 답변을 달아주면 크게 도움이 되리라고 생각합니다. 

애슬란에 따르면 큰 문제는 이런 인과적 설명조차도 이슬람에만 적극적으로 적용하고 다른 종교들은 그 정도가 낮다는 것입니다. 그래서 이슬람 극단주의의 행위를 이슬람이라는 종교를 믿고 있는 그들의 신념과 필연적으로 연결된다고만 주장하는 것은 터무니 없다는 겁니다. 이렇게 신념과 행동의 필연적인 인과관계만 본다면, 보수적인 이슬람 전체를 테러집단으로 볼 수 있게 된다는 것이죠. 여기에 더하여 애슬란은 여러 사람이 갖는 신념이 우리에게 아무리 불합리하게 보일지라도 그들이 믿는 바를 자유롭게 믿을 수 있어야 한다는 것입니다. 진짜 우리가 대처해야 할 때는 그런 신념들이 폭력적인 행동을 초래할 때라는 것입니다. 그 때는 이런 신념을 가진 사람이든 아니든 연합해서 이들의 폭력행위에 맞서야 된다는 것이죠. 

이러한 애슬란의 주장은 많은 문제를 노정하고 있습니다. 그의 말대로라면, 우리가 신념이 폭력행위로 나타났을 때, 대처할 수 있지 그 이전에는 그럴 필요가 없다는 말로 비칠 수도 있습니다. 오래 전에 사회학자 Charles Glock과 Rodney Stark이 이러한 신념과 행동의 상관성에 대한 연구를 한 적이 있습니다. 기독교인들의 유대인을 향한 반셈족주의에 대한 것인데요. 만일 기독교인들이 유대인들에 의해서 부정적인 신념을 갖고 있으면 유대인에 대한 부정적인 감정을 일으키며, 적절한 기회가 주어지면 그러한 신념에서 오는 감정이 행동으로 분출될 수 있다는 것입니다. 

그렇게 볼 때, 한국적 상황에서 동성애도 죄라는 신념을 갖고 있으면서 동성애자 혐오증에 절은 보수기독교인들이 어떤 계기가 일어나면, 그것에 대한 반작용으로 반동성애적 운동을 전개할 가능성이 높다는 것입니다. 이와같이 반공이념에 투철한 사람들이 이석기 이름만 나와도 혐오감을 갖고 있다가 북조선에 대한 화해의 말이나 진보적인 행동을 보였을 때의 reaction을 상상할 수 있습니다. 그런데 모든 보수기독교인들이 팻말 들고 나오지 않고, 모든 반공주의자가 까스통 할배는 되지 않습니다. 

이러한 사회적 작용에 대한 우리의 인식과 행동은 어떤 것인지 저의 생각을 담지 않을려고 했는데 많이 담게 되었습니다. 아래 글은 그러한 토론의 주제를 담고 있습니다. 여러분의 생각은 어떤지 그냥 읽어 보시고 의견을 달아 주시면 감사하겠습니다. 아래 무신론자 쌤 해리스를 애슬란이 비판하고 있는데 유심히 읽어 보시구요. 

잠자기 전에 몇자 적었습니다. 그럼....

http://www.12newsnow.com/story/27019015/belief-in-islam-doesnt-cause-terrorism

 E

ditor's note: Reza Aslan is the author of "Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth" and a professor of creative writing at the University of California, Riverside. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his.

(CNN) -- The tragic murder of Cpl. Nathan Cirillo by Michael Zehaf-Bibeau -- "a recent convert to Islam" as every media outlet in the United States would like to remind you -- has added fuel to the already fiery debate in this country over the inherently violent nature of religion in general, and Islam in particular.

It seems that, in the minds of many, the only possible reason a Muslim convert would go on a shooting spree in the Canadian Parliament is because his religious beliefs commanded him to do so.

Of course, it could very well be the case that Zehaf-Bibeau was motivated by his Islamic beliefs. It could be that he read a particular passage in the Quran, understood it to mean he should kill as many Canadian government officials as possible, and then went out and did just that.

After all, there's no question that a person's religious beliefs can and often do influence his or her behavior. The mistake lies in assuming there is a necessary and distinct causal connection between belief and behavior -- that Bibeau's actions were exclusively the result of his religious beliefs.

The notion that there is a one-to-one correlation between religious beliefs and behavior may seem obvious and self-evident to those unfamiliar with the study of religion. But it has been repeatedly debunked by social scientists who note that "beliefs do not causally explain behavior" and that behavior is in fact the result of complex interplay among a host of social, political, cultural, ethical, emotional, and yes, religious factors.

In the case of Bibeau, his violent behavior could have been influenced as much by his religious beliefs as by his documented mental problems, his extensive criminal past or his history of drug addiction. Yet, because Bibeau was a Muslim, it is simply assumed that the sole motivating factor for his abhorrent behavior was his religious beliefs.

Indeed, there's even a term for this idea: Sudden Jihad Syndrome -- an imaginary contagion invented by the neo-conservative commentator Daniel Pipes to describe how any normal-seeming Muslim can suddenly snap for no reason at all and go on a murderous rampage (thus proving Pipes' point that "all Muslims must be considered potential terrorists").

Strangely, this causal connection between belief and behavior seems not to be as aggressively applied if the criminal in question claims a different religion than Islam. Take the example of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik, who slaughtered 77 people, the majority of them children, in 2011. Breivik explicitly defined himself as a Christian warrior fighting what he called an "existential conflict" with Islam.

Nevertheless, a great deal of the media coverage surrounding his actions seemed to take for granted that his crime had nothing to do with his Christian identity -- that it was based instead on his right-wing ideology, or his anti-immigrant views, or his neglectful upbringing, or even, as Ayan Hirshi Ali famously argued, because his view that "Europe will be overrun by Islam" was being censored by a politically correct media, leaving him "no other choice but to use violence."

All of the above explanations for Breivik's behavior, including his religious beliefs, are pertinent in understanding the motivations for his behavior. But to argue that Breivik's or Bibeau's actions were motivated solely by their religious beliefs -- or that their religious beliefs necessarily dictated their actions -- is simply irrational.

And yet, this trope has become exceedingly common among some critics of religion. Take the following excerpt from the bestselling book "The End of Faith," by the anti-theist activist Sam Harris (Note: because Harris has repeatedly tried to defuse the significance of his argument and has even gone so far as to accuse those, including me, who quote his words of defamation, I will present the passage in its entirety so that there can be no confusion as to his meaning).

"The link between belief and behavior raises the stakes considerably. Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them. This may seem an extraordinary claim, but it merely enunciates an ordinary fact about the world in which we live. Certain beliefs place their adherents beyond the reach of every peaceful means of persuasion, while inspiring them to commit acts of extraordinary violence against others. There is, in fact, no talking to some people. If they cannot be captured, and they often cannot, otherwise tolerant people may be justified in killing them in self-defense."

Harris' argument is that a person's religious beliefs do not merely influence his or her behavior. They determine it. In other words, people holding certain beliefs should be killed, not because those beliefs may lead to violent behavior, but because they necessarily will. Therefore, in order to save ourselves ("self-defense" Harris calls it) we may be justified in killing the believer before his or her beliefs turn into action -- as they inevitably will.

It is true that religious beliefs can often lead to actions that violate basic human rights. It is also true that a great many of those actions are taking place right now among Muslims. But it is ridiculous to claim that the actions of Islamic extremists are either necessarily or exclusively the result of their belief in Islam.

There may be millions of Muslims who share the ultra-orthodox, puritanical strain of Islam -- called Salafism -- that fuels the members of ISIS. But the U.S. is not at war with Salafism (if it were we would have bombed Saudi Arabia long ago). It is at war with ISIS, and not because of what they believe, but because of the actions they have carried out based on their interpretation of those beliefs.

Arguing otherwise leads to the preposterous conclusion that anyone who shares any measure of religious beliefs with a violent extremist is equally guilty for that extremist's violent actions -- regardless of how diverse the interpretations of those beliefs may be. In fact, Harris makes this exact point: "Given the link between belief and action, it is clear that we can no more tolerate a diversity of religious beliefs than a diversity of beliefs about epidemiology and basic hygiene."

The danger of this mistaken view of "the link between belief and action" is that it makes it that much more difficult to counter religious violence. When we condemn an entire community of faith for sharing certain beliefs with extremists in their community, we end up alienating the very people who are best positioned to counter such extremism in the first place.

People should be free to believe whatever they want to believe, no matter how irrational those beliefs may appear to us -- just as people should be free to criticize those beliefs. It is when such beliefs lead to violent behavior that people of all faiths -- as well as those of no faith -- should unite in condemnation.